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Food Safety Regimes in Scotland, 1899–1914
Michael French and Jim Phillips
One of the authors of this paper was recently discussing the historical
literature on inter-war unemployment in Britain with a class of honours
students, who were amused by the assertion of the scholar who charac-
terised this as a regional phenomenon, concentrated in ‘Scotland,
northern Britain, south Wales and northern Ireland’.1 Where, won-
dered the students, was this region called ‘northern Britain’, and
what kind of ‘region’ was Scotland? Such eccentric and Anglo-centric
conceptualisations of the United Kingdom have perhaps become less
pervasive since 1991, when this example was published. The most
significant general corrective here has probably been the devolution to
Scotland of aspects of political power, but of great importance – when
reconfiguring ideas of Britain – in academic and particularly historical
circles has been the steady expansion of published research on
Scotland’s varied economic, social and political development since the
Industrial Revolution. Much of this research has, to an extent, revolved
around the question of Scottish particularity – or exceptionalism –
within the United Kingdom, and also developed understanding of the
huge variety of economic and social conditions in industrial Scotland.
These have encompassed differentiated experiences of class, gender and
religion, and the contrasting degrees of development between rural and
urban society and according to geographical location. In both cases –
whether examining Scotland’s position in the Union or different
experiences in Scotland – the historical literature has engaged with and,
to some extent, under-mined the notion that Scotland can be viewed
as a homogeneous economic, social and political ‘region’. Examples of
three different kinds of historical writing commonly illustrate this trend:
Clive Lee’s 1995 study of the twentieth-century Scottish economy,
which places substantial emphasis on the regional as well as sectoral
pattern of difference and development; Tom Devine and Richard
Finlay’s edited collection of 1996 on the twentieth century, the diversely
themed chapters of which bring out the huge variety of life in modern
Scotland; and Ian MacDougall’s Voices from Home and Work, published
in 2000. Gathering evidence from, inter alia, coal miners, laundresses,
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building workers, forestry workers, railway workers and a journalist, this
points to the difficulty of identifying a common experience of work in
Scotland’s sectorally-segmented economy.2
It is within this broad area of inquiry, the heterogeneous economic,
social and political character of modern Scotland, that this paper, on
Food Regimes in Edwardian Scotland, should be read. Contemporary
Scotland has a problem with food. This encompasses concerns about
poor nutrition, diet and health, particularly among infants and school-
age children and low-income groups, and also involves concerns about
the quality and especially the safety of food. These have been amplified
by a number of separate food scares, most notably BSE-infected beef
and the spread of E-coli 0157, which have focused attention on the
importance of food safety and the alleged weaknesses of food regu-
lation.3 The E-coli episode in Lanarkshire of 1996 could be seen as a
Scottish component of a more general British picture, for throughout
the UK in the later 1990s food scares – along with doubts about the
health and safety implications of new methods of food manufacturing,
such as irradiation or genetically based production – generated
demands for new regulatory agencies to serve the views and interests
of consumers rather than those of retailers and producers. In 2000 the
Food Standards Agency was established with the remit of protecting and
consulting consumers, reacting to food scares, promoting research and
education on health and nutrition and developing food regulation
generally. The FSA was a UK-wide agency, and an FSA for Scotland
was located in Aberdeen with a similar role. These new institutions gave
a sharper focus to food policy and greater centralisation. But – and
herein lies the importance of regional diversity in Scotland as in the UK
– the practical enforcement of food laws continued to be the respon-
sibility of local councils through the activities of public health officials,
trading standards departments and environmental health officers.4
These contemporary debates about food safety and regulatory
regimes have important historical precedents. Scotland’s food regu-
lations were originally devised in the late nineteenth century in broadly
similar terms, with panics about safety and quality leading to the estab-
lishment by central government of a national food regime. But this
regime was allowed to develop in highly localised institutional, econ-
omic and social circumstances. This paper examines the fragmented
nature of this food regime in Edwardian Scotland, and in so doing
highlights the extent of regionalised or even localised economic, social
and political diversity in this period. Generally speaking there were
substantial differences of enforcement between urban and rural local
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authorities, and between burgh (or town) authorities and the larger
city authorities. In rural and burgh authorities, generally speaking,
dominant business or commercial interests obstructed a more positive
enforcement of the law. Such enforcement was achievable, however, in
larger urban areas where business was characterised by greater diversity
or dominated by branches of industry or commerce that were not
directly affected by the food regime. The discussion proceeds in three
broad sections. The first part examines adulteration – the crux of the
perceived food problem in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries – and the administrative mechanisms designed to remedy it.
The second part looks at the highly localised nature of the enforcement
of the food regimes, with fragmentation even extending, in the case
of Glasgow, to differing degrees of enforcement within a single local
authority. The final part analyses the more general problems of enforc-
ing the food regime and adds to the wider significance of the paper by
standing as a corrective to the generally – but to an extent unwarranted
– positive historiographical picture of the Victorian food laws.
Adulteration and administrative organisation
The 1875–99 Sale of Food and Drugs Acts (SFDA), which formed
the basis of food law in the United Kingdom until 1955, were the first
attempts at providing food consumers with legislative protection. The
key issue in this period was adulteration, defined under the SFDA as the
addition of anything which rendered food ‘injurious’ to health, or which
altered – ‘to the prejudice of the purchaser’ – its ‘nature, substance and
quality’. The initial public interest in food regulation stemmed from
the developing perception, from the 1850s onwards, that dangerous
and fraudulent food posed a potentially serious threat to public health
and legitimate traders. The landmark 1875 SFDA emerged only after a
lengthy period of gestation, involving a mixture of scientific publicity
and official investigation and several earlier ineffective attempts at legis-
lation.5 The 1875 Act sought to establish a compulsory system of inspec-
tion and analysis, administered by local authorities, that was intended
to check adulteration. The legislation also offered legal protection to
manufacturers of ‘mixtures’, such as mustard or cocoa powder, since
ingredients that were identified on the label were accorded legitimacy
providing they did not pose any risk to health. The effectiveness of the
system established in 1875 was greatly diminished by the refusal of
many local authorities to take their new food responsibilities seriously.
In England and Wales in 1898–99 there were ten large counties and
sixteen large boroughs where the authorities had ‘almost entirely failed’
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to invoke the law.6 Consequently, the 1894–96 Parliamentary Select
Committee on Food Products Adulteration recommended that the law
be transformed from a permissive one to a compulsory measure. The
resulting SFDA of 1899 allowed central government to intervene and
enforce the regulations wherever local authorities continued to neglect
the law. This central direction was assigned to the Local Government
Board for England and Wales (LGB) and to the Local Government
Board for Scotland (LGBS). Both agencies believed in a system of local
enforcement as the appropriate administrative mechanism, but neither
exerted great pressure on inactive councils. The LGB’s officials were
cautious about greater centralisation on principle, believing in the
fundamental value of local responsibility. Levitt has argued that the
establishment of the LGBS in 1894 symbolised the political elite’s
greater concern with social welfare as a means to maintain social order.7
But food policy was a low priority and the LGBS only took a serious
interest in food regulation following the passage of the 1899 SFDA. In
all areas of its remit, the LGBS relied heavily on local government for
the implementation of its policies and the enforcement of regulations
and, as in England and Wales, the Edinburgh department had limited
powers or inclination to coerce councils. Localism inevitably produced
diversity, with financial and organisational limitations on the effective-
ness of small councils as regulators.8 At the other extreme one-third
of the Scottish population lived in Aberdeen, Dundee, Edinburgh, and
Glasgow by 1911. The political elites of these major cities, as Morris
emphasised, were associated by the 1890s with an acceptance of utilis-
ing local police powers to improve local water supplies, develop trans-
port and regulate nuisances such as air and water pollution, and a
tendency to more active enforcement of the food regime seems to have
followed in these urban centres.9 Broader consumer concerns about
the quality and safety of food were evident in the rapid growth of Co-
operative societies, particularly in central Scotland, with their emphasis
on the provision of pure food.
In Scotland the scale of operations under the SFDA increased con-
siderably from 1899. Even in 1900 one-third of counties and burghs in
Scotland had not submitted any samples for analysis, but by 1901 the
LGBS noted with satisfaction that the vast majority of local authorities
were now meeting their legal obligations to gather samples and submit
them for analysis. The new SFDA supplied the threat of government
intervention and from the LGBS the medical adviser, Dr James Burn
Russell, urged local authorities to enforce food inspection, particularly
of meat and milk.10 In common with the LGB in England and Wales,
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the LGBS believed that an increasing level of sampling would lead to a
decreasing level of adulteration, and pressed local authorities to increase
periodically their sampling until the proportion of adulterated samples
fell significantly. The figures in Table 1, compiled by the LGBS from the
quarterly reports of public analysts, indicate the progress made in
enforcing the law after 1899, and suggest some proof for the believed
relationship between increasing sampling and decreasing adulteration.
There was not, however, a sustained fall and, as a result, the LGBS’s
annual reports regularly advocated more consistent activity.
The most commonly sampled commodity was milk, which – as
Table 2 indicates – was more commonly found to be adulterated than
other items. Indeed, the principal reduction in adulteration in this
period was among non-milk items, and the preponderance of milk
sampling arguably lent an artificial inflation to the aggregate level of
adulteration. There are two main explanations for milk’s special place
within the adulteration figures. First, it was a very simple product to
adulterate, requiring nothing more complicated than the addition of
water or skimmed milk. In his work on English milk, P. J. Atkins has
shown that the commercial incentive to adulterate was increasing in the
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Table 1. Level of adulteration of formally purchased food samples in
Scotland, 1900–13
Percentage
Year Samples adulterated
1900 2253 14.4
1901 5493 11.8
1902 6761 11.0
1903 6644 9.0
1904 7396 9.0
1905 7221 9.2
1906 7614 9.8
1907 6842 9.7
1908 6891 10.8
1909 7204 10.5
1910 7238 11.1
1911 7083 9.7
1912 6675 10.8
1913 6642 9.9
Note: The data for 1900 and 1901 are based on the first nine months of each year only.
Source: Figures compiled from the published annual reports of the Local Government Board for
Scotland, 1900–1914.
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late nineteenth century, as supply struggled to keep pace with demand.11
Second, the offence of milk adulteration was relatively easy to detect
and punish as minimum official standards for milk were in place from
1901. These were based on evidence submitted by dairy trade analysts
and representatives to the 1894–96 House of Commons Select Com-
mittee on Adulteration, and stipulated that milk should comprise at least
3% fat solids and 8.5% of non-fat solids.12 The standards, issued by the
Board of Agriculture for England and Wales and applied in Scotland,
were admitted to be modest. Thomas Nasmyth, Medical Officer of
Health for Fife and Clackmannan, reflected on the Board of Agri-
culture’s concession in 1901 that the standards were ‘necessarily fixed at
figures lower than those which are usually afforded by genuine milk’.13
Nonetheless they reinforced local efforts to improve the safety of milk,
eased the sampling and analysis of milk and the prosecution of dis-
honest milk traders.14 It is clear that local authorities targeted the
fraudulent sale of milk. Thomas Nasmyth noted that, ‘In unambiguous
language’, any milk not meeting the standard was ‘skimmed or
watered’.15 Table 2 indicates that there was an immediate rise in the
level of milk adulteration in 1901 and 1902 and then a reduction,
presumably as producers and traders adjusted to the new regime,
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Table 2. Percentage adulterated for formally purchased milk and non-milk
food samples in Scotland, 1900–13
Year Non-milk samples Milk samples
1900 12.8 15.8
1901 9.8 18.3
1902 6.9 16.2
1903 6.0 13.1
1904 6.0 12.8
1905 6.6 12.3
1906 6.5 13.4
1907 6.3 13.0
1908 7.2 14.3
1909 6.4 14.2
1910 5.8 15.5
1911 6.9 14.0
1912 6.5 13.9
1913 4.9 13.6
Note: The data for 1900 and 1901 are based on the first nine months of each year only.
Source: Figures compiled from the published annual reports of the Local Government Board for
Scotland, 1900–1914.
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although the slight rise after 1905 implies that there was no sustained
improvement in milk quality.
The uneven quality of milk in the 1900s may also have reflected
the manner in which the apparent clarity of the 1901 regulations was
subverted in regulatory practice. Courts did usually find against defen-
dants, but there was the possibility of an ‘appeal to the cow’. This
defence rested on proving that the poor quality milk had come directly
from the cow rather than being a result of any adulteration. A further
sample would be drawn from the beast in the presence of local authority
officials and if this also failed to meet the standard then the conviction
was quashed on the grounds that no adulteration had taken place. In
1910 Edinburgh’s health officials challenged this convention, arguing
that genuine milk had to have at least 3% fat and anything containing
less, even if unadulterated, was an inferior product.16 However, the court
upheld the ‘appeal to the cow’, sanctioning a natural, even if deficient,
product. One rare reversal of this pattern was witnessed in Aberdeen in
1905 when a dairyman was convicted of selling milk that contained just
2.32% fat. Although the appeal samples contained more than 3% fat,
the charge was declared unproven, the judge being persuaded by testi-
mony from the dairyman’s family that the original samples had not in
fact been adulterated.17
The localised character of enforcement
Although local enforcement was central to the food safety regime, its
operations have received little attention from historians. The standard
pattern was for the health authority to appoint inspectors under the
direction of either the local Sanitary Inspector, as in Glasgow, or the
Medical Officer of Health, notably Henry Littlejohn in Edinburgh and
Matthew Hay in Aberdeen. Medical Officers of Health enjoyed higher
social and professional status. Food inspection, including unwholesome
food, was part of a wider local inspectorate with larger staffs usually
assigned to deal with housing conditions, pollution, workshop con-
ditions and shop hours. The inspectors took formal and informal
samples that were tested by the public analyst. The food laws also
allowed private citizens to submit foods for analysis, subject to the
payment of a fee. Such private sampling, almost entirely of milk,
was significant only in Dundee between 1900 and 1913. In the vast
majority of cases the non-privately sampled items, health committees,
advised by the Sanitary Inspector or Medical Officer of Health, of
initiated any prosecutions in consultation with the Procurator Fiscal.
With over 200 separate authorities, enforcement practices were
140 Scottish Economic & Social History
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potentially highly variable. This tendency was to some extent offset by
the central direction supplied by the LGBS and the unifying influence
of precedent and case law. There was a further degree of cohesion
through the activities of the public analysts who were responsible for
determining the composition of food samples and declaring, by com-
pleting a written certificate or report, and, if required, testifying in
courts, whether a particular item was adulterated. Analysts were also
guided by their professional training, and the publication of descriptions
and tests of food composition, notably in The Analyst, Scottish Analyst and
in standard guides to the food laws by leading practitioners. In practical
terms, fragmentation was further reduced by the practice of smaller
authorities combining their SFDA activities and by the tendency for
public analysts to hold appointments with several authorities, a practice
that testified to the limited quantity of testing performed in many places.
Table 3 shows the distribution of appointments among the nineteen
analyst’s practices in Scotland in 1904. The number of appointments
does not always indicate size or importance. In Glasgow the volume of
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Table 3. Public analysts in Scotland by number of local authority
appointments, 1904
G. D. Macdougald, Dundee 60
John Falconer King, Edinburgh 24
John Hunter, Edinburgh 22
James Hendrick, Aberdeen 21
J. W. & W. L. Biggart, Greenock 20
James Davidson, Dumfries 20
Tatlock and Thomson, Glasgow 12
John Clark, Glasgow 11
Stevenson, Macadam, Edinburgh 11
Andrew Wilson, Stirling 6
Thomas Jamieson, Aberdeen 4
Martin Dechan, Hawick 3
J. Watson Robertson, Glasgow 3
R. R. Tatlock, Glasgow 3
G. H. Gemmell, Edinburgh 2
McCowan & Biggart, Greenock 2
D. R. Drinkwater, Edinburgh 1
F. W. Harris, Glasgow 1
Total 226
Source: Official Publications, Cd 2514, 1905, Tenth Annual Report of the Local Government Board
for Scotland, 1904, pp. 605–9.
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analytical work was sufficient to be divided among three firms, namely
F. W. Harris, R. R. Tatlock and John Clark. Generally the analysts
represented regional groupings of authorities. G. D. Macdougald’s
business was centred in Fife, Dundee and Perthshire; Hendrick held
appointments across Aberdeenshire; James Davidson’s work was in
southwest Scotland and John Hunter – in a notable triumph of the
Edwardian postal service – chiefly served both the Lothians and
Caithness.
The main impact of the increasing sampling after 1899 was among
the Scottish burghs. In 1900 these market towns were usually less active
in sampling than their neighbouring county authorities. Some burghs
reportedly relied on County Councils to undertake their SFDA work.18
The evidence of inactivity to 1913 probably reflected the influence in
local politics of grocers and other retailers combined with reluctance to
disrupt the town’s marketing role. By 1913, however, burgh authorities
were generally more active than the counties, indicating that the 1899
Act and LGBS pressure had overcome local inertia. The four largest
cities were more vigilant than either rural or burghal authorities in
pursuing milk offenders. The traditions and institutions of activism had
been developed in the late nineteenth century, generally through the
activities of public health professionals given scope to operate by liberal
political elites committed to improved hygiene as an integral element in
the construction of civic pride. After 1900, for instance, the Aberdeen
City Council directed a concerted attack on milk adulteration, as the
figures in Table 4 illustrate.
These figures imply deterioration in general food quality after 1908,
though some part of this trend was a result of more effective enforce-
ment. At the request of the Sanitary Inspector, Kenneth Cameron,
councillors successfully pressed the local sheriff to increase fines,
especially for repeat offenders. The usual penalty in other parts of
Scotland was a fine not usually exceeding £2. As a result of Cameron’s
intervention, a dairyman convicted for the third time in Aberdeen in
1910 was fined £12. Committing the same offence once more in 1912,
he was fined £25. Cameron based his call for increased penalties on a
calculation in 1909 that milk adulteration had cost the city’s consumers
more than £4000, assuming an average abstraction of 20% of the fat of
the 3.5 million gallons sold over the course of the year.
Aberdeen City Council’s consumer-protectionist activism can use-
fully be contrasted with the different priorities pursued by the surround-
ing County Council, which was less interested in regulating the activities
of milk producers, and in fact tended to regard producers rather than
142 Scottish Economic & Social History
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consumers as the victims of adulteration. The main problem across
the County, Aberdeenshire’s analyst observed in 1907, was rancid
butter, supplied by a handful of careless producers. ‘It is butter of this
kind,’ he noted, ‘which injures the reputation of the whole district, and
depreciates the value of all local butter in the market.’19 None of these
rancid supplies were actually fraudulent under the terms of the Sale of
Butter Regulations, introduced in 1902. Like the milk standards, these
related to quality rather than safety, fixing an upper limit of 16% water
content.20 Aberdeenshire County Council gathered a far smaller pro-
portion of milk samples than its city neighbour, focusing instead on
testing the purity of butter, cheese, spirits and drugs. While using its
powers to defend the quality and hence the market value of locally-
produced butter, the County Council was less keen on protecting the
health of consumers than its City neighbour. The comparative figures
for 1911 indicate that 61 of the County’s 250 samples, about 25%, were
milk compared to 156 of the City’s 250 samples, or some 66%. The
County could not justify this shortfall in milk sampling on the grounds
that milk adulteration was less serious in the country. Indeed the level of
milk adulteration was slightly higher in the country – 14.8% compared
to 13.5% in the city. It seems reasonable to conclude that the County
was simply more reluctant than the City to regulate the activities of
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Table 4. Sampling and adulteration of food and milk in Aberdeen, 1900–13
Year All Adulterated Milk Adulterated
samples (%) samples (%)
1900 206 1.5 39 0.3
1901 208 2.9 35 5.7
1902 297 3.0 46 4.3
1903 206 5.8 27 22.2
1904 186 1.6 61 4.9
1905 148 2.0 34 8.8
1906 173 1.8 50 4.0
1907 189 1.6 45 2.2
1908 212 7.1 81 14.9
1909 253 8.7 126 15.1
1910 255 7.1 114 14.0
1911 236 9.3 156 13.5
1912 243 15.2 137 20.9
1913 272 5.9 97 11.3
Source: Aberdeen City Archives, City of Aberdeen, Sanitary Inspector’s Annual Reports, 1900–13.
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the locally influential dairy trade. The general contrast between county
and city was not complete since elsewhere the Ayrshire, Edinburgh
and Dumbartonshire county authorities were all active in testing milk.
Yet the Aberdeenshire example does conform to at least one generally
observable trend, namely the tendency for different balances of
producer and consumer interests to result in locally differentiated
approaches to food sampling. The sense of competing interests was
evident when Glasgow’s long-serving Sanitary Inspector, Peter Fyfe,
recommended that the council oppose the Government’s proposals
to limit the proportion of butter allowed in margarine. It was thought
that inflating the quantity of butter in a margarine would increase its
attraction and so undercut demand for pure butter. But, according to
Fyfe, existing enforcement powers were sufficient and the proposal was
designed solely to ‘bolster up the agricultural interest’ and, as such, was
counter to the ‘general public interest’.21
Fyfe’s consumer-protectionist ambitions in this area reflected
Glasgow’s general reputation and record as an interventionist authority
in relation to public services, including health matters, in the late nine-
teenth century. Hart identified a combination of middle-class pro-
gressives seeking enhanced public utilities with minimal increases in
rates and ‘bureaucratic’ professionals promoting health reforms.22 Such
local activism, combined with civic pride, was a means to mobilise
reform, though its force fluctuated according to the state of the econ-
omy and the shifting political landscape, and was questioned in the later
Edwardian period with the economic downturn from 1908 and doubts
about Liberalism’s capacity to satisfy the competing interests of middle
and working class supporters.23 Grocers had a presence in local politics,
but were far less influential than in the Scottish burghs given the greater
size and diversity of Glasgow’s middle-class and the political influence,
albeit diminishing, of industrial elites. The city’s arrangements for food
inspection developed significantly in the 1870s with the appointment of
key public health professionals and the initiation of regular sampling.24
This trend was promoted by the early Sale of Food and Drugs Act, but
also by a local food scare concerning the adulteration of whisky.25 James
Burn Russell, the city’s dynamic Medical Officer of Health from 1872
to 1898, pursued inspections of milk, including supplies from farms
outwith the city. Glasgow City Council acquired additional powers to
prevent the sale of infected milk and meat via local acts in 1889 and
1890. Local pride and interests could promote resistance to direction
from central government or a preference to deal directly with West-
minster rather than the LGBS. Glasgow city council, for instance,
144 Scottish Economic & Social History
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directly lobbied the 1894–96 Parliamentary Select Committee on Food
Products Adulteration, though had to settle for submitting a petition
after its requests to send witnesses were refused.26 National and local
elements intersected with Russell’s appointment to the LGBS in 1898,
when his departure left the corporation’s Sanitary Inspector, Peter Fyfe,
as the leading influence, via a sub-committee of the health committee,
in the local enforcement of food regulations in Edwardian Glasgow.
Fyfe was appointed as Chief Sanitary Inspector in 1885, serving until
1919 and being active in the formation of the Sanitary Inspectors’
Association of Scotland.27 Internal professional rivalries arose over the
implementation of new meat inspection laws when the 1907 Public
Health Act placed inspectors of imported foods under the direction of
Medical Officers of Health. Both Fyfe and the city’s Veterinary Officer
criticised their exclusion, arguing that the scheme unnecessarily divided
the food inspection system. This local contest for authority was resolved
through a compromise in which imported meats were inspected by
officials from the Sanitary Department and veterinary officials under
the direction of the Medical Officer of Health.28
In the early 1900s the corporation employed four food inspectors
and one inspector of fish among a total local inspectorate of fifty-six. Its
resources and prestige were symbolised by the opening of the new
Sanitary Chambers in 1897. The main targets of food inspection were
byres, restaurants, butchers’ shops, and premises selling milk and ice
cream.29 The Sanitary Department’s annual reports provide some
insight into the system of enforcement. During 1903 Glasgow’s
food inspectors took 601 samples under the SFDA plus a further 171
informal samples and 17 samples for bacteriological examination.30 Of
the 601 formal tests, the analysts certified 501 as genuine, so that the
proportion of adulterated samples was 17%. In line with the general
pattern, the most sampled products were milk and butter and the rate
of adulteration for milk was 35% compared to only 10% for non-milk
samples. Their activities were subject to external scrutiny and lobbying.
In 1903 the Board of Agriculture in London noted that Glasgow’s milk
sampling was below the level of other large cities, but after discussions
Fyfe and the Health committee decided to continue their existing prac-
tices.31 They similarly resisted calls for closer attention to the mixing
of margarine with butter from the Butter Trade Association, which sent
two representatives to sample butter in the city in 1904.32 This was
consistent with Fyfe’s earlier opposition – in 1898 – to new laws that
would privilege the interests of butter producers by limiting the amount
of butter that could be incorporated in margarine. Two years later,
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however, Fyfe reported substantial adulteration of butter. He sub-
sequently associated adulteration of butter with ‘shops designated
variously as ‘The Irish Mart’, ‘The Irish Produce Stores’, and ‘The Irish
Ham, Butter and Egg Store’.33 The corporation, prompted by Fyfe
and its Public Analysts, supported other extensions of the food laws,
including broadening the SFDA to include food standards. This con-
trasted with the situation in Aberdeenshire in the 1890s and early 1900s
where the Public Analyst, James Hendrick, consistently supported the
introduction of national food standards. Councillors rejected this
advice, concluding that prosecution in every case should be left to the
discretion of the Procurator-Fiscal. Councillors also chose not to heed
Hendrick’s calls for a central scientific committee to set standards. The
question of compositional standards was raised again several years later,
when Hendrick reported on two samples of a sweet, sold as ‘black sugar’
but generally believed to be liquorice. Neither sample contained much
more than a trace of liquorice, but, as the sweet was not sold strictly
as liquorice, it was not possible to obtain a conviction. The chair
of Aberdeenshire’s Public Health Committee, Councillor J. Watt of
Rathen and Deer, hit upon an unusual solution to the problem. In order
to avoid future uncertainties the committee would simply desist from
sampling any items for which there existed no generally recognised
standard of quality or composition. Watt’s colleagues agreed this course
of action. In Glasgow prosecutions over the quality of jam were aban-
doned as courts decided that, in the absence of any official standards,
any product conventionally accepted as jam was legitimate whatever its
precise composition.
The Glasgow Sanitary Department’s Annual Report provides some
insight into the geographical distribution of sampling between the city’s
twenty-five wards.34 Table 5 lists each ward in terms of their share of the
city’s population at the 1900 Census along with their share of all
sampling and of all cases of adulteration in 1903. The distribution
of sampling by ward corresponded loosely to population size, but the
striking exception was the Exchange ward, which accounted for 6% of
samples and 12% of case of adulteration. Inspections were apparently
focused on the wholesalers in this area and thereafter on the retailers
around the centre of the city, a pattern evident in the 1870s. The impli-
cation is that inspectors operated strategically, seeking to detect and
deter adulteration by key distributors rather than scattering their efforts
evenly across the city. So – an important point to emphasise – if there
were clear differences between urban and rural food regimes, there was
also extreme localism within this single city, with targeting of sampling
146 Scottish Economic & Social History
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based on assumed differences between wards in the extent of adulter-
ation. The pattern probably reflected the distribution of the city’s food
shops, since it was also evident in ward-level reporting of the detection
of unwholesome meat and resembled the concentration of restaurants
in the city. Sampling and inspections tended to be lower in relation to
population share in the outlying suburbs, such as Pollokshields and
Kelvinside. The use of ward level data blurs social distinctions to some
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Table 5. Distribution of population and adulteration by ward in Glasgow,
1903
% % %
Ward Population Population Sampling Adulterations
1 Dalmarnock 50859 6.7 3.7 2
2 Calton 38960 5.1 4.8 7
3 Mile-end 43169 5.7 4.2 7
4 Whitevale 33778 4.4 4 2
5 Dennistoun 32509 4.3 3.7 5
6 Springburn 41360 5.4 2.8 3
7 Cowlairs 29781 3.9 3.2 3
8 Townhead 39898 5.2 6.5 3
9 Blackfriars 23087 3 4.5 6
10 Exchange 2232 0.3 6 12
11 Blythswood 3596 0.5 0.2 0
12 Broomielaw 8337 1.1 2.7 0
13 Anderston 29452 3.9 5 3
14 Sandyford 26488 3.5 3.3 4
15 Park 24953 3.3 3.7 6
16 Cowcaddens 39960 5.2 6.7 10
17 Woodside 45653 6 5.5 3
18 Hutchesontown 41974 5.5 5.2 5
19 Gorbals 36537 4.8 3.7 5
20 Kingston 34762 4.6 5.5 5
21 Govanhill 33787 4.4 6 6
22 Langside 29625 3.9 3.7 3
23 Pollokshields 16984 2.2 1.7 0
24 Kelvinside 18854 2.5 1 0
25 Maryhill 36384 4.8 3.2 0
762979 100.2 100.5 100
Sources
Population: Glasgow City Archives, Annual Report of the Operations of the Sanitary Department
of the City of Glasgow, 1903, pp. 34–5.
Adulteration: Glasgow City Archives, Annual Report of the Operations of the Sanitary Department
of the City of Glasgow, 1903, pp. 30–1.
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degree, but Table 6 ranks wards by death-rate and shares of detected
adulteration. Higher rates of adulteration do correlate with above-
average death rates, implying that adulteration was most commonly
detected in low-income districts. Again the Exchange ward is an outlier
with its small resident population and clustering of wholesale and retail
outlets. Dennistoun and Govanhill rank significantly higher in their
share of adulterations than death rates, but both were heterogeneous
communities with sizeable lower-income districts. Although food
inspections apparently promoted improved quality in working-class
diets, Glasgow’s emerging Labour politicians were antagonistic towards
Fyfe’s Sanitary Department. This reflected its roles in housing and
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Table 6. Glasgow wards ranked by death-rate and by adulteration rate
Average death rate, Adulteration rate,
Ward 1903–20 1903
1 Dalmarnock 12 10
2 Calton 9 16
3 Mile-end 1 2
4 Whitevale 16 3
5 Dennistoun 2 15
6 Springburn 18 21
7 Cowlairs 3 9
8 Townhead 20 5
9 Blackfriars 4 18
10 Exchange 8 19
11 Blythswood 13 20
12 Broomielaw 19 14
13 Anderston 10 6
14 Sandyford 17 7
15 Park 6 8
16 Cowcaddens 15 13
17 Woodside 14 17
18 Hutchesontown 7 22
19 Gorbals 21 1
20 Kingston 25 4
21 Govanhill 11 11
22 Langside 5 12
23 Pollokshields 23 23
24 Kelvinside 24 24
25 Maryhill 22 25
Sources: death rates: A. K. Chalmers, The Health of Glasgow, 1818–1925: An Outline (Glasgow, 1930),
p. 76; adulteration rates: as Table 5.
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medical services where inspectors could be an intrusive and powerful
presence in working-class families, though food inspection may also
have annoyed marginal shopkeepers in low income areas.
Problems in enforcing the food regime
Across the different kinds of locality there were significant problems
associated with attempts to enforce the food regime. Milk, as the first
part of this paper emphasised, occupied a position of particular import-
ance in debates about adulteration, which was reflected in the intro-
duction of the 1901 regulations on minimum standards. These made
the detection and punishment of adulteration more straightforward but
did nothing to prescribe defined levels of cleanliness. Indeed in 1903
the LGBS resisted pressure from the Association of County Councils in
Scotland to undertake bacteriological analysis of ice cream under the
SFDA. The Board argued that the SFDA was intended to test whether
products were genuine and not whether foods were ‘wholesome’.35 Any
health concerns were, according to the LGBS, to be addressed under
the terms of the Public Health (Scotland) Act of 1897. Nor did they
alleviate or even highlight the danger of milk infected with bovine
tuberculosis. Local authorities were, however, keen to target milk
because of its special position in the diet, especially of infants, and its
particular qualities as a vehicle for transmitting infectious diseases.
According to Nasmyth, vendors of adulterated milk were ‘perpetrating
a gross injustice on the poor, infants, children and invalids, who may
have to struggle for their lives while being fed the sophisticated
commodity’.36 In Edinburgh food inspectors and the Medical Officer
of Health were concerned to trace adulteration along production and
distribution systems in order to identify the major perpetrators.37 Their
standard practice was to sample milk at one of the many dairy shops
around the city centre, mainly small shops run by women. Where milk
was found to be below the standard, the retailer was confronted. If, as
frequently happened, the retailer claimed that the milk was sold as
received from a supplier, the trader was persuaded to make a formal
complaint of dissatisfaction with the quality of their milk. This took the
form of a request for officials to ‘safeguard myself and my customers’ by
taking a second sample when the supplier made their next delivery.38
Often the chain led back to a dairy or farm where inspectors offered to
inspect the herd and take further samples, but these producers might
refuse access. In one case an inspector noted that the dairyman gave the
‘usual excuse that milk had been purchased from other dairy keepers’.39
The Edinburgh case brings out the problems inherent in policing
Food Safety Regimes in Scotland, 1899–1914 149
02 pages 111-188  18/2/04  10:46  Page 149
milk quality, and reinforces the importance of the higher degree of adul-
teration of milk relative to other products. The comparatively low level
of adulteration for items other than milk, highlighted in Table 2, would
seem to indicate that the 1899 amendment to the SFDA, compelling
local authorities to enforce the law, had a highly positive impact in terms
of improving food quality and safety. Confidence in the validity of these
figures as a true test of safety and quality has to be balanced, however,
by two central problems that were becoming apparent to the regulatory
authorities after 1900. One of these was the method by which samples
of food and drink were obtained; the other was the fact that the nature
of adulteration was altering as methods and ingredients of manufac-
turing were changing. The Aberdeenshire public analyst identified the
central weakness of food sampling in 1900, advising councillors that it
was extremely difficult to ‘secure adulterated specimens’ of coffee ‘if the
inspector is recognised as such’.40 In other words officials could only
monitor the quality of food that retailers knowingly sold for analysis.
This was recognised as a potential difficulty in 1905 by the LGBS,
which used its subsequent annual reports to encourage the practice of
‘informal’ sampling. Officials would gather samples anonymously either
personally or through paid agents or deputies, often women and some-
times children, in order to monitor the behaviour of suspected traders
and to target future formal sampling and legal proceedings. Table 7
indicates a substantial discrepancy between adulteration of formal and
these ‘informal’ samples in Edwardian Scotland.
This discrepancy partly arose from inspectors targeting informal
sampling among traders suspected of fraudulent trade and perhaps
from the Edinburgh strategy of tracing a single adulteration back along
the distribution chain. But in assessing the ‘true’ level of adulteration it
is worth reiterating that informal sampling only arose because traders
were suspected of supplying officials with different items from those
that regular customers received. So the actual scale of adulteration was
probably below the informal figure, but above the formal figure. The
gap also suggests an additional, though speculative, explanation for the
high level of milk adulteration. Presumably traders who sold adulter-
ated milk had not diluted it themselves, because they made no attempt
to regulate sampling, selling it to officials as they received it so this
adulteration was presumably committed chiefly by wholesalers or
farmers. The dishonest grocer and provision merchant concentrated
on items like butter and coffee that came into their premises unmixed.
These would be mixed with substitutes like margarine or chicory and
sold to ordinary customers with small amounts of the original com-
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modities retained unmixed and sold to inspectors. Manipulation of the
sampling process in this manner by dishonest grocers would widen the
gap between milk and non-milk adulteration.
Alive to the possible weaknesses in sampling procedures, in 1909
the LGBS attempted to establish the broader impact of the law since
1899 by asking local authorities to report on its general effectiveness.
Numerous sampling officers reported as fact that their familiarity as
local figures prevented them from gathering samples of the same items
that were sold to ordinary customers. This was especially the case in
rural or smaller urban areas, like Bridge of Allan or St Andrews, where
the sampling officer believed that news of his presence and purpose was
spread around town by telephone conversations between shopkeepers.
Small towns also worked against the use of deputies or agents, a prac-
tice recommended by both the LGBS and the Association of Public
Analysts in Scotland, which emphasised that women of ‘business ability’
were especially likely to outwit the ‘dishonest trader’.41 The idea was
that a deputy would call at the targeted premises and request the chosen
commodity. As this was being served, the inspector would enter and
complete the purchase and conduct the necessary legal formalities.
The Bridge of Allan officer had tried using local deputies, but found it
impossible to preserve their anonymity in his small locality. So the prac-
tice had greater success in larger urban environments, especially in west-
central Scotland, where officials had been regularly using agents since
the early 1900s. Reporting on the findings of its 1909 survey, the LGBS
was particularly keen to endorse the systematic approach of the County
of Lanark’s man in Coatbridge. He used three types of agent or deputy:
a ‘working man of the labouring class, roughly and carelessly dressed’
to purchase samples of whisky and butter; a woman ‘attired in rough
clothing’ to buy butter; and boys under fourteen years of age or girls
under sixteen to obtain milk and butter. The official paid these agents
5s for each service rendered and a further 10s 6d per day for attending
court hearings. His colleagues in Motherwell, who would enter the shop
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Table 7. Adulteration of formal and informal samples in Scotland,
1904–13 (%)
1904 1908 1913
Formal 9.0 10.8 9.9
Informal 20.3 21.0 18.9
Source: Figures compiled from the published annual reports of the Local Government Board for
Scotland, 1904–13.
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before the agent and purchase what amounted to a decoy sample,
adopted a variant of this approach. While this sale was being transacted
the agent, a young boy or girl, would come in and purchase the real item
targeted by the visit. In 1911 Glasgow’s Sanitary Department reported
its engagement in a ‘contest of wits’ involving ‘various deputies, dis-
guises and other forms of strategy’ with a few unscrupulous retailers
over margarine and butter sales.42
Lanarkshire’s rogue traders were not all taken in by this new practice,
however. One grocer’s wife confirmed her suspicion that an unfamiliar
customer was an agent by coming out on to the street. Seeing the
inspector waiting on the threshold, she re-entered the shop and warned
her husband who, when asked by the agent for butter, replied that
he had none in stock.43 While dishonest or obstructive grocers were
difficult to entrap, it was even harder to confound travelling vendors
suspected of fraudulent activity. Lanarkshire officials found it difficult,
for example, to entrap itinerant butter salesmen who were suspected
of supplying a mixture of butter and margarine. When approached by
officials, the traders either said that their stock was finished or supplied
them from a small amount of genuine butter that was carried in case of
inspection. Recognising that only regular purchasers were receiving the
fraudulent article, these enterprising officials concealed themselves in
such consumers’ homes. When a doorstep sale took place the inspector
would suddenly appear to complete a formal purchase, which could
be used as evidence in proceedings. The plan did not always succeed,
however, for few regular customers, reluctant to appear in court, were
willing to co-operate.44
The case of the vigilant Lanarkshire grocer’s wife pointed to another
issue raised by the 1909 survey, namely the need for officials to inject
variety into all aspects of their sampling practices. The LGBS report
commented on the value of rotating agents in order to protect their
anonymity. It also suggested varying the means by which milk was
purchased: an official’s jug or can, regularly used even by a range of
agents, could be easily recognised by sharp-eyed and unscrupulous
retailers. More generally the LGBS was concerned that local authorities
gathered samples from a narrow and unchanging range of commodi-
ties, and visited shops on the same day each month, allowing traders to
operate from day to day without the threat of inspection. As a result the
LGBS periodically sent ‘reminders’ to some local authorities of their
legal obligations under the SFDA, which included the need to analyse
a wide range as well as simply a minimum overall number of samples.
In 1906 the LGBS found that numerous authorities were not even
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sampling the two most commonly adulterated items, milk and butter.45
The LGBS also questioned the suitability of police officers for the
purpose of collecting samples. Monotony of approach was partly the
difficulty here, but familiarity with retailers was also problematic, with
police constables even more visible in the community than civilian
sampling officers. The police conducted sampling in many rural areas,
including Aberdeenshire, where a uniformed police inspector visited
retailers’ premises and gathered samples with a uniformed police
constable as witness. The LGBS pressed the Council to adopt an
approach that would ‘disarm suspicion’ among potentially dishonest
grocers, including the use of civilian deputies. But, having consulted
police officers throughout the county, the Chief Sampling Officer
informed the Council that the public was already fully protected.
Informal sampling was also ruled out in Aberdeenshire, on the untested
assumption that covertly gathered items would simply be no different
from those that were generally supplied.46 This blankly contradicted the
evidence contained in the LGBS statistics, indicating a higher level of
adulteration among informal than formal samples.
While revealing weaknesses in the mechanism for identifying
offenders, the LGBS survey in 1909 also highlighted widespread official
dissatisfaction with the methods of punishment. Only one local auth-
ority, Banffshire, recorded the view that the system of fines in place
represented an effective deterrent. The Motherwell sampling officer
noted that ‘public exposure (was) dreaded more than fines’, a perspec-
tive confirmed from all quarters, including Aberdeen, Alloa, Arbroath,
Burntisland, Govan, Glasgow, Inverness, Perth and Dundee, where the
low level of fines was reported as actively encouraging adulteration and
holding ‘no fear for the nefarious trader’. Only in isolated instances
did imposed penalties match the levels permitted under the law, a maxi-
mum fine of £50 for a first offence in selling adulterated items, and six
months hard labour for second and subsequent offences. In 1908 in
Lanarkshire a grocer was convicted for the third time for the same
offence, selling margarine as butter. Having previously paid a total of
£62 12s in fines, he was presumably fortunate to escape with a punish-
ment of just fourteen days in prison. Similarly, in cases of obstruction of
the law, offenders could expect reasonably lenient treatment. The maxi-
mum penalty here was a £50 fine for the first offence penalty (or three
months imprisonment, with or without hard labour) and a £100 fine
for a second offence. In Aberdeen in 1900 officials were able to secure
the conviction of a shopkeeper who had sold a sample of barley to the
sanitary inspector. When told it was being taken for analysis he caught
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hold of the item and refused to relinquish it for sale. For this clear
infringement he was fined just £3.
The various weaknesses inherent in the process of sampling, together
with the relatively high level of adulteration among informal samples,
suggest that the 1875 and 1899 Sale of Food and Drugs Act were
only partially effective. The continuing practice of adulteration as a
commercial ploy by a significant minority of grocers also indicates that
the legislation was more controversial than historians have usually
suggested. The contested nature of the law was emphasised by the
Association of Public Analysts in Scotland, the professional body of
officials responsible for monitoring food quality and levels of adulter-
ation. In April 1912 the Association’s Honorary Secretary, John William
Biggart, who was also Public Analyst for Greenock, submitted a lengthy
memorandum to the LGBS outlining the difficulties under which many
of his members operated. He reminded the government that many local
authorities had been reluctant to enforce the law and had only done so
as a result of the 1899 amendment forcing them to take samples. The
chief explanation, in Biggart’s view, was the business bias of local
government. Bluntly expressed, ‘the work of the Public Analyst con-
stitutes a surveillance over business in which some members of Local
Authorities are engaged’. Hence ‘the more fearlessly and con-
scientiously’ the analyst performed his duties, ‘the greater is his liability
to improper treatment’ at the hands of grocer-councillors. Biggart
recognised that Parliament had anticipated this problem in 1875, and
placed the question of approving the appointment and removal of
analysts in the hands of central government. But local authorities had
developed subtler means of controlling their analysts. Where a council
wished to remove an analyst it could simply increase his workload or
reduce his fees to the point where he could no longer operate.47
The pressures weighing on public analysts and other local officials
were summarised in a special ‘Food Number’ of The Times, published in
June 1914, and linked with a wider debate, that had been running since
the early 1900s, about the desirability of changes to the legal framework.
According to The Times, the ‘energetic inspector’ could easily cross
‘strong vested interests’ – the butcher or baker who sat on the council –
in the conduct of his duties under the food laws. These duties could be
simplified, and the pressures on officials duly eased, if ‘adulteration of
each particular article of food and drink’ was ‘specifically defined and
its composition determined’. This mechanical process would remove
from the analyst the difficult job of determining whether a sample was
actually adulterated: he would simply be required to measure whether
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the sample met the required qualities. An expert Court of Reference,
appointed by the Local Government Board, would determine the
standards and definitions.48
These various difficulties in enforcing the law, including the extent of
entrenched, although localised, business subversion of its provisions,
have generally been overlooked by historians of food and food adulter-
ation. Standard historical interpretations of food adulteration have
generally been positive. The most thorough study, by John Burnett,
argues that the Victorian food laws forced producers to improve quality,
so that by the beginning of the twentieth century food no longer posed
a significant threat to public health.49 The nature of adulteration had
certainly changed by the 1900s, taking more subtle forms perhaps
and posing less immediate danger to public health. This reflected the
increasingly complex and developed nature of food processing. The
purchasers of ‘black sugar’ in Aberdeenshire, who erroneously believed
they were buying liquorice, were not being poisoned, but they were
certainly being misled. Aberdeenshire’s blank refusal to tackle the prob-
lem arguably symbolises the wider reluctance of councils, particularly
in rural and smaller urban environments, to pursue effective forms of
consumer protection that would have challenged the right of business
to operate with a minimum of regulatory restraints. The 1899 SFDA,
combined with the encouragement from the LGBS, did produce
increasing sampling, especially in market towns. These regulatory
pressures were less effective in rural counties, where enforcement
remained a low priority. In the four large cities food safety regimes,
driven by health professionals, were more fully developed. In Glasgow,
scene of perhaps the most developed form, local enforcement displayed
considerable self-confidence in resisting external pressures from the
LGBS or commercial interests and in campaigning for national food
standards. Even so there were bureaucratic rivalries among the differ-
ent professions. The immediate falls in adulteration rates between 1900
and 1903 indicate that the 1899 Act and the 1901 Milk Regulations
had an effect, but thereafter the stability of adulteration rates to 1913
suggests limits to the impact of the legislation and its enforcement.
Aberdeen’s concerted campaign against milk adulteration between
1908 and 1912 demonstrated the persistence of the practice. The
partial nature of the law’s enforcement in Scotland before 1914, includ-
ing the difficulties facing analysts and other officials who attempted to
challenge local trader-councillors, suggests that the broad tendency of
Scottish local government was towards protecting commercial rather
than public health or consumer interests. The continuing use of adul-
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teration as a commercial ploy – traders deliberately defrauding the
public to maximise their own profits – operates as a further corrective
to the view that the food laws were effective and non-controversial.
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